User:119/Blitzkrieg outline
< User:119
I. Definition A. Operational-level doctrine of Germany during the Second World War B. Concentration of mobile forces at a decisive point (Schwerpunkt), motorization of all elements, devolved decision-making, momentum and morale as critical factors in combat power II. Theories A. Tanks only saw use in the First World War as infantry support tools B. J.F.C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart's conception of the "indirect approach" C. Guderian theories on maneuver, schwerpunkt, combined arms D. Bllitzkrieg is evolutionary in the context of German history; First World War infiltration tactics III. Panzertruppe A. Identification of requirements and development of early tanks B. Early field exercises C. Mature requirements 1. Maneuverability of tanks versus physical combat power 2. Motorization of infantry and artillery--kampfgruppe 3. Air reconnaissance and attack D. Armor-infantry balances throughout the war? E. Panzergrenadiers F. Token mention of airborne infantry? IV. Methods A. Blitzkrieg as maneuver warfare: reduction of enemy's will to fight through indirect means, specifically regarding communications and the mass capture of prisoners B. Blitzkrieg as attrition warfare: exploitation of maneuver-derived advantages for favorable attrition C. Tactical 1. Decentralized planning and execution A. Directive control B. Individual initiative C. Two-way radio D. Point navigation 2. Motorization of all elements A. Self-propelled artillery B. Tank destroyers C. Attack aircraft as 'flying artillery' D. Aerial and armored reconnaissance (fighting reconnaissance) D. Operational 1. Infantry breach the enemy's defensive line 1. Mobile forces pass through breach, "breakthrough" 2. Mobile forces exploit maneuverability by, depending on maneuver/attrition focus, indirect means or encirclement of enemy for 3. Annihilation E. Disagreements over use of panzertruppe 1. Scepticism that XIX Army Corps was capable of being vanguard in the invasion of France 2. Major crisis over the deployment of panzerarmees near or far during Operation Barbarossa V. Operations A. Successes 1. Invasion of Poland, Fall Weiss A. Deployments in East Prussia and Czechoslovakia allowed for German forces to begin the operation with much of Poland already encircled. B. Poland was only partially mobilized and generally suffered from poor organization. C. The Polish armed forces had little effective defense against armor or aircraft. 2. Invasion of France, A. Surprise at all levels by an invasion through the Ardennes B. High mobility and operational tempo by lead of XIX Army Corps C. Inability of Allied forces to respond to German mobility and speed 3. Invasion of the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa A. Surprise B. 4. Battle of Kiev, B. Failures 1. Battle of Moscow A. Loss of mobility because of Soviet winter 2. Battle of Kharkov, Operation Zitadelle A. German panzer forces were launched into a defense in depth of prepared positions. B. Incorrect usage of high-mobility forces C. Lack of surprise 3. Battle of the Bulge, Watch am der Rhine A. Limited road network B. Lack of air cover in later days VI. Limitations A. Dependent on terrain 1. Mobile forces are excluded from land that is wooded, marshy, hilly, mountainous, or urban. 2. Bridges across rivers offer choke points which forces can be expected to move towards. B. High operational requirements 1. High fuel requirements 2. High-quality manufacturing processes 3. Multitude of chassis and mounts, etc. 4. Complexity of tactics and need for quality small-unit leadership C. Mobility is key 1. Lack of air cover prevents mobility 2. Deployment of strong mobile reserves opposites limits opportunities